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ABSTRACT 
 
EDWARD L. OWENS: Bankruptcy Contagion and the Market Response to Intra-Industry 
Earnings News 
(Under the direction of Robert M. Bushman and Wayne R. Landsman) 
 
 
 I seek a deeper understanding of bankruptcy contagion and its impact on the industry 
information environment by examining how intra-industry bankruptcy affects the equity 
market response to earnings news subsequently released by industry survivors. I document 
significant negative asymmetry, i.e., a weaker response to good relative to bad news, in the 
response to earnings news in the wake of intra-industry bankruptcy. Results are consistent 
with a combination of model uncertainty-induced asymmetry and an on-average reduction in 
earnings informativeness stemming from increased cross-firm default risk assessments. 
Results are further consistent with managerial preemptive disclosure of good news 
exacerbating, but not completely explaining, this asymmetry. Additional tests provide 
evidence that these information effects are directly associated with contagion. The results 
facilitate a deeper understanding of contagion, and provide evidence that bankruptcy imposes 
broader industry-wide consequences than previously documented. 
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1. Introduction 
 In this study, I seek a deeper understanding of bankruptcy contagion and its impact on 
the industry information environment by examining whether intra-industry bankruptcy 
affects the equity market response to surviving firms’ subsequent earnings news. I use the 
term “contagion” to denote the phenomenon where a default by one firm increases the 
market’s assessment of the default risk of other firms. I provide evidence that intra-industry 
bankruptcy diminishes the response to surviving firms’ earnings news, consistent with the 
economic logic that increased default risk assessments lead to weaker stock price reactions to 
earnings information (e.g., Subramanyam and Wild, 1996; Barth, Beaver, and Landsman, 
1998). I find that the decrease in response primarily reflects a diminished response to good 
news, i.e., there is negative asymmetry in the response in that good news is weighted less 
than bad news. Results are consistent with managerial preemptive disclosure of good news 
exacerbating, but not completely explaining, this asymmetry. Additional tests reveal that the 
results vary predictably with proxies for contagion intensity, which provides evidence that 
these information processing effects are directly associated with intra-industry bankruptcy 
contagion. The results of the study facilitate a richer understanding of contagion, and provide 
evidence that bankruptcy has broader industry-wide consequences than previously 
documented. 
 This study extends the literature that documents a number of contemporaneous cross-
firm consequences of intra-industry bankruptcy. Lang and Stulz (1992) documents that when 
a firm announces Chapter 11 bankruptcy, there is a contemporaneous decrease in the value-
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weighted portfolio of surviving industry firms, consistent with a dominant on-average 
contagion effect. Jorion and Zhang (2007) finds that Chapter 11 bankruptcy announcements 
contemporaneously increase the spreads on credit default swaps of industry competitors, 
which provides clear evidence that intra-industry Chapter 11 bankruptcy increases the 
perceived default risk of surviving firms. Consistent with that evidence, Hertzel and Officer 
(2008) documents that corporate loan spreads are significantly larger when loan originations 
or renegotiations follow incidence of intra-industry bankruptcy. Importantly, that study 
documents that intra-industry bankruptcy has cross-firm credit market effects that extend 
beyond contemporaneous announcement effects. The key innovation of my study is the 
recognition that not only does bankruptcy contagion have direct cross-firm consequences for 
prices (e.g., stocks, loans, credit default swaps), but it also can fundamentally affect the 
information processing environment of an industry and alter the manner in which the equity 
market responds to subsequent news.  
 The underlying economics of default contagion are not well understood (e.g., 
Schönbucher, 2003; Das, Duffie, Kapadia, and Saita, 2007). Credit risk models that focus on 
the portfolio level typically rely on the assumption that default risk is uncorrelated across 
firms after controlling for common systematic drivers. However, empirical evidence rejects 
this assumption (e.g., Das et al., 2007). Several models have been proposed to explain excess 
default risk correlation across firms, including direct causal models of counterparty risk (e.g., 
Jorion and Zhang, 2009) and models based on learning-from-default. Learning-from-default 
models posit that an observed default event (e.g., intra-industry bankruptcy) causes investors 
to update their beliefs about unobservable variables that affect other firms’ assessed default 
risk, which can explain excess observed correlation in credit spreads (e.g., Giesecke, 2004). I 
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rely on insights from the learning-from-default model, and the updating of beliefs mechanism 
in particular, to formally develop the prediction that contagion in the wake of bankruptcy can 
affect subsequent information processing in an industry. 
 Prior research examines the effect of firm-specific default risk on the equity market 
response to earnings information. Using a value-relevance framework, Barth et al. (1998) 
finds that the weight investors place on own-firm earnings (book values) decreases 
(increases) during the period leading up to bankruptcy, consistent with a decreased focus on 
continuing earnings relative to liquidation values. Relatedly, several long-window 
association studies document that the market response to earnings news, i.e., the earnings 
response coefficient, is negatively related to a firm’s default risk and probability of 
bankruptcy (Dhaliwal, Lee, and Fargher, 1991; Dhaliwal and Reynolds, 1994; Subramanyam 
and Wild, 1996). Accordingly, I hypothesize that if bankruptcy increases investors’ 
assessment of default risk of surviving industry firms, investors will respond less to earnings 
news from such firms in the wake of intra-industry bankruptcy. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, I provide evidence that there is a significantly weaker market response to news in 
earnings announcements released in the wake of intra-industry bankruptcy relative to 
earnings announcements not preceded by intra-industry bankruptcy. 
 Interpretation of the on-average decrease in the response to bankruptcy-wake earnings 
news requires examination of possible negative asymmetry in the response, i.e., weaker 
response to good news relative to bad news, which can stem from two independent 
contagion-related sources. First, a class of economic theories involving model uncertainty 
(e.g., Epstein and Schneider, 2008) posits that when decision makers are faced with certain 
types of uncertainty, pessimistic updating of beliefs induces negative asymmetry in the 
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response to information. To the extent such pessimistic behavior is descriptively valid, it is 
likely that it would manifest during periods of contagion. Second, contagion creates 
incentives for managers of surviving firms to preemptively disclose good news in response to 
intra-industry bankruptcy announcements. Any such increase in voluntary good news 
disclosure could result in an observed negative asymmetry in the response to earnings 
announcements, driven by contagion-induced changes in information flow rather than 
changes in information processing. 
 I provide evidence that intra-industry bankruptcy induces negative asymmetry in the 
market response to earnings news relative to the response to earnings news in the absence of 
intra-industry bankruptcy. Moreover, this asymmetry results primarily from a decreased 
response to good news in the wake of bankruptcy, with bankruptcy having little apparent 
effect on the response to bad news. Results are consistent with a combination of model 
uncertainty-induced asymmetry and an on-average reduction in earnings informativeness 
stemming from increased cross-firm default risk assessments. Results are further consistent 
with managerial preemptive disclosure of good news exacerbating, but not completely 
explaining, this asymmetry.  
 Additional tests reveal that the negative asymmetry in the response to earnings news 
released in the wake of intra-industry bankruptcy varies predictably based on proxies for 
contagion intensity. Negative asymmetry is more pronounced during periods where multiple 
intra-industry bankruptcies exist, and for firms that have a greater degree of economic 
comparability with their industry peers. Moreover, the effects of bankruptcy on the response 
to earnings news are insignificant for firms with relatively good financial health, consistent 
with good financial health mitigating contagion effects. The totality of evidence provides 
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support for the interpretation that the cross-firm effects of intra-industry bankruptcy on the 
market response to news are directly associated with contagion, and is inconsistent with 
competing explanations. 
 In addition to the information transfer and default contagion literatures, this study 
contributes to the literature that examines how uncertainty in the firm- or market-level 
information environments affects the market response to firm-level earnings news. Skinner 
and Sloan (2002) finds evidence of negative asymmetry in the response to earnings news for 
glamour stocks, where the underlying source of uncertainty is the model of earnings for a 
particular firm. Conrad, Cornell and Landsman (2002) utilizes insights from regime-
switching models (e.g., Veronesi, 1999) to provide evidence that uncertainty about the state 
of the macroeconomy induces negative asymmetry in the response to firm-level earnings 
news. Using a different theoretical underpinning (model uncertainty), Williams (2009) finds 
evidence of negative asymmetry in the response to firm-level earnings news following 
increases in macroeconomic uncertainty. My study provides evidence that industry-level 
bankruptcy contagion is an independent driver of asymmetry in the market response to firm-
level earnings news.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses literature 
related to intra-industry bankruptcy contagion and develops the study’s hypotheses. Section 3 
discusses the study’s empirical setting, including the bankruptcy-related partitioning of 
earnings announcements, and describes sample construction. Section 4 presents my research 
design. Section 5 presents and discusses the results of the study. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Background and hypothesis development  
2.1. Cross-firm consequences of intra-industry bankruptcy 
  Examination of the intra-industry consequences of bankruptcy is rooted in the 
information transfer literature (e.g., Foster, 1981). Bankruptcy-related information transfer 
studies generally distinguish between “contagion” effects and “competitive” effects, which 
describe whether the information that is transferred is “bad” or “good” for the non-
announcing firms.1
 Using a sample of large Chapter 11 bankruptcies, Lang and Stulz (1992) documents a 
contemporaneous decrease in the equity value of a value-weighted portfolio of industry 
competitors at the time of bankruptcy announcements, consistent with a dominant on-average 
contagion effect. In an extension of Lang and Stulz (1992), Ferris, Jayaraman, and Makhija 
(1997) likewise uses stock returns to provide evidence that the contagion effect is dominant 
among both large and small firm Chapter 11 bankruptcies, even among the set of firms with 
the highest likelihood of experiencing a competitive effect. 
 There are two common views of contagion in that literature (Lang and 
Stulz, 1992). The first view is that bankruptcy makes market participants wary of the 
financial health of other firms in the same industry, resulting in a contemporaneous decrease 
in firm values. The second view is that a bankruptcy portends financial distress at other firms 
with similar business models. In contrast, the competitive effect reflects the change in value 
of the non-announcing firm that is attributable to wealth redistribution from the bankrupt 
firm to the survivors. The observed event period stock returns of non-announcers reflect the 
sum of contagion and competitive effects.  
                                                          
1 Warner (1977) and Altman (1984) are credited with coining the terms “contagion” and “competitive” effects, 
respectively. 
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 Jorion and Zhang (2007) examines contemporaneous intra-industry effects of Chapter 
11 bankruptcy announcements on cross-firm credit default swap (CDS) spreads. A CDS is a 
credit derivative contract between two counterparties, where the buyer makes periodic 
payments to the seller and in return receives a payoff if a given firm defaults on the 
underlying debt. The CDS spread is the annual amount the buyer must pay to the seller, 
where a greater spread implies greater default risk, ceteris paribus. Focusing on CDS spread 
reactions as opposed to stock price responses allows a cleaner test of the effects of intra-
industry bankruptcy on surviving firms’ assessed default risk.2
 Consistent with the results in Jorion and Zhang (2007), Hertzel and Officer (2008) 
finds that corporate loan spreads are significantly larger when loan originations or 
renegotiations follow incidence of intra-industry bankruptcy. Further, that study provides 
evidence that lenders are more likely to require collateral in the wake of intra-industry 
bankruptcy. Importantly, that study documents that bankruptcy contagion imposes debt 
market consequences that extend beyond contemporaneous bankruptcy announcement 
effects. Although extant literature provides convincing evidence that intra-industry Chapter 
11 bankruptcy is a contagion-inducing event, that literature has not examined the effects of 
intra-industry bankruptcy on the subsequent processing of surviving firms’ information by 
the equity market. 
 Jorion and Zhang (2007) finds 
that Chapter 11 bankruptcy announcements contemporaneously increase intra-industry CDS 
spreads, which provides evidence that Chapter 11 bankruptcies are predominantly contagion 
events.  
                                                          
2 As an example of the problems encountered in using stock price as an indicator of default risk, consider that 
an increase in firm leverage leads to greater credit risk, but can also create a wealth transfer to shareholders, in 
which case stock price appreciates. 
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2.2. Correlated default risk 
 A growing literature seeks to understand cross-firm default risk correlation (e.g., Das 
et al., 2007; Duffie, Eckner, Horel, and Saita, 2009). Standard credit risk models assume that 
default risk derives its randomness from a set of observable firm-specific (e.g., leverage, 
asset volatility) and macroeconomic (e.g., interest rates) state variables, and that firm-specific 
defaults are independent events after conditioning on these observable covariates (e.g., 
Duffie, Saita, and Wang, 2007). However, those models have been rejected based on 
empirical evidence of default risk correlation in excess of that predicted by observable 
covariates (e.g., Das et al., 2007).  
 A leading class of models that attempts to explain such excess default risk correlation 
posits a learning-from-default mechanism, where assessed default risk includes the expected 
effects of random unobservable variables (e.g., Jarrow and Yu, 2001; Schönbucher, 2003; 
Giesecke, 2004; Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Helwege, 2008). This class of models 
provides a structured way of thinking about how intra-industry bankruptcy affects default 
risk assessments of surviving firms. In these models, the observance of a default causes, via 
Bayes’ rule, a jump in the conditional distribution of the unobservable variables, with an 
associated jump in conditional default probabilities of any other firms whose default 
probabilities depend on the same unobservable covariates (e.g., firms in the same industry). 
Oft-cited examples of this are the defaults of Enron and WorldCom, which revealed faulty 
accounting practices that could have been in use at other firms. These defaults may have 
caused a sudden reduction in the perceived precision of accounting leverage measures of 
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other firms, consequently affecting their conditional default probabilities.3
2.3. Default risk and the on-average response to earnings news 
 A key implication 
of the learning-from-default model is that it suggests bankruptcy is an event that can cause 
investors to update default risk assessments for other firms, consistent with evidence in 
Jorion and Zhang (2007) and Hertzel and Officer (2008)  
 Prior literature examines the effect of firm-specific default risk on the market 
response to earnings information. Using a value relevance framework, Barth et al. (1998) 
documents that the valuation weight investors place on earnings (book values) progressively 
decreases (increases) over the five-year period directly preceding bankruptcy. That result is 
consistent with the idea that as default risk increases, investors view liquidation values as 
more relevant to firm valuation than future economic earnings. Relatedly, Subramanyam and 
Wild (1996) documents a negative relation between earnings response coefficients and 
probability of bankruptcy, consistent with the idea that earnings persistence is determined, in 
part, by the market’s view of an entity’s going-concern status. Using long window 
association studies, Dhaliwal et al. (1991) and Dhaliwal and Reynolds (1994) document 
empirically that earnings response coefficients are negatively related to default risk, 
consistent with the hypothesis that increases in default risk increase the discount rate applied 
to unexpected earnings.  
 These studies suggest that, if intra-industry bankruptcy increases the assessed default 
risk of surviving firms, it is likely that such contagion will weaken the equity market’s 
response to intra-industry earnings news until implications of the bankruptcy for surviving 
                                                          
3 Consistent with this, Yu (2005) provides empirical evidence that a reduction in the measured precision of 
accounting variables is associated with a widening of credit spreads. 
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firms are better understood. This logic suggests that the on-average market response to 
earnings news is weaker for earnings announcements that follow intra-industry bankruptcy 
(hereafter referred to as “bankruptcy-wake” earnings announcements) compared to those that 
do not (hereafter referred to as “non-bankruptcy-wake” earnings announcements). However, 
whereas the above-referenced studies provide evidence that earnings responses are affected 
by default risk as captured by observable firm-specific measures (e.g., leverage, bond 
ratings), it is unclear whether contagion-induced increases in perceived default risk will 
induce similar equity market effects. Accordingly, I test the following hypothesis, stated in 
alternative form:  
H1: The market response to earnings news is weaker for bankruptcy-wake 
earnings  announcements than for non-bankruptcy-wake earnings 
announcements. 
 
2.4. Contagion and asymmetry in the response to earnings news 
 Previous studies that examine the relation between default risk and the market 
response to earnings information do not examine asymmetry in the responses to good versus 
bad earnings news. However, contagion raises the potential for negative asymmetry in the 
response to earnings announcements, i.e., a weaker response to good news relative to bad 
news, from two independent sources: contagion-induced model uncertainty, and contagion-
induced managerial disclosure of good news. Interpretation of the effect of bankruptcy 
contagion on the response to intra-industry earnings news requires exploration of this 
potential asymmetry. 
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2.4.1. Contagion and model uncertainty 
 The learning-from-default model assumes that investors update their prior beliefs 
about variables that affect cross-firm conditional default probability assessments in Bayesian 
fashion. However, a class of economic theories involving model uncertainty (e.g., Hansen 
and Sargent, 2001; Epstein and Schneider, 2008) assumes that decision makers do not always 
update priors in accordance with Bayes’ rule, and posits that pessimistic updating in the face 
of uncertainty induces negative asymmetry in the response to information.4
 Intra-industry bankruptcy has the potential to introduce several forms of model 
uncertainty, each of which implies negative asymmetry in the response to earnings news 
released in the wake of bankruptcy. First, if investors are surprised by an intra-industry 
bankruptcy, investors may have concern that the accounting system of the bankrupt firm did 
not produce financial statements that revealed the impending financial distress. This may 
lead investors to question how precisely the accounting systems in the overall industry 
capture underlying firm economics, leading to uncertainty over the precision of earnings 
announcements (e.g., Yu, 2005). Second, intra-industry bankruptcy could make investors 
uncertain about the volatility in the fundamentals of surviving firms in the industry. For 
example, bankruptcy may make investors fear that the prior belief they held about 
fundamental volatility in the industry before the bankruptcy announcement was formed with 
 In brief, investors 
reflect their pessimism by placing great weight on reported bad news and little weight on 
reported good news. It is plausible that, to the extent such pessimistic behavior is 
descriptively valid, it will manifest in the wake of contagion-inducing information shocks.  
                                                          
4 Model uncertainty has been linked to numerous aspects of capital market behavior. Epstein and Wang (1994) 
proves the existence of equilibrium in an asset pricing model that admits a role for ambiguity. Anderson, 
Ghysels and Juergens (2009) provides empirical evidence that model uncertainty explains a substantial portion 
of equity returns. 
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too little consideration of downside risk. In Appendix A, I outline a model from Epstein and 
Schneider (2008) to illustrate how these types of model uncertainty can induce larger stock 
price responses for bad relative to good earnings news. Finally, bankruptcy may make 
investors uncertain about the persistence of surviving firms’ reported earnings because of the 
bankruptcy’s unknown future product or labor market implications. This would lead to a 
pessimistic slant towards models with high (low) persistence in the face of bad (good) news, 
likewise generating negative asymmetry in the response to earnings news (e.g., Hansen and 
Sargent, 2001). 
2.4.2. Contagion and managerial disclosure incentives 
 A large literature examines managerial voluntary disclosure incentives and how 
market participants react to such disclosures (e.g., Patell, 1976; Penman, 1980; Baginski, 
Conrad, and Hassell, 1993; Skinner, 1994; Miller, 2002; and Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki, 
2009). The seminal studies of Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) suggest that managers 
will fully disclose all information. However, evidence suggests that voluntary earnings 
forecasts in advance of large earnings surprises are relatively rare (Kasznik and Lev, 1995), 
and that the frequency of voluntary disclosure is greater for bad news than for good news 
(Skinner, 1994). In general, the literature has relied on theories of disclosure costs (e.g., 
Verrecchia, 1983) and investor uncertainty about the possession or content of managers’ 
private information (e.g., Dye, 1985; Jung and Kwon, 1988) to explain the absence of 
complete voluntary disclosure. In any event, economic logic suggests that managers will not 
voluntarily disclose news if the all-in cost of disclosure is greater than the all-in cost of non-
disclosure. Because preemptive disclosure of good news is observed relatively infrequently, 
13 
 
it follows that in many cases the cost of good news disclosure must outweigh the cost of non-
disclosure. 
  Evidence suggests that bankruptcy contagion leads investors to reassess default risk 
at surviving firms with a broad brush, forcing all firms to bear contagion-related costs (e.g., 
Hertzel and Officer, 2008). Stated differently, it is likely that contagion increases the cost of 
non-disclosure of good news. Therefore, some firms that would not preemptively disclose 
good news in non-contagion equilibrium will find it advantageous to preemptively disclose 
good news to mitigate broad-brush contagion effects.5 This relative increase in preemptive 
disclosure of good news during periods of bankruptcy contagion will result in an observed 
negative asymmetry in the response to news at the earnings announcement date, as the 
market response to good news will take place prior to the earnings announcement.6
 Consideration of model uncertainty and managerial disclosure incentives in the wake 
of intra-industry bankruptcy leads to the following hypothesis, stated in alternative form: 
 In this 
case, the observed change in earnings response in the wake of intra-industry bankruptcy 
would be attributable to a contagion-induced change in information flow, rather than a 
change in information processing. 
H2: There exists negative asymmetry, i.e., a weaker response to good news 
compared to bad news, in the response to bankruptcy-wake earnings announcements 
relative to non-bankruptcy-wake earnings announcements. 
 
                                                          
5 Using related logic, Sletten (2009) provides evidence that managers in firms that experience negative 
abnormal returns around an intra-industry restatement are more likely to disclose good news between the 
restatement and the firms’ earnings announcement. 
 
6 As a recent example, in the wake of numerous Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings in the retail industry (e.g., 
Goody’s on 6/9/2008, Steve & Barry’s on 7/9/2008), Macy’s, Inc. CEO Terry Lundgren filed a letter to Macy’s 
executives with the SEC under Reg. FD on Friday, 7/11/08. The letter stated “On a quarter-to-date and year-to-
date basis, our same-store sales trends are better than J.C. Penney, Kohl’s, Dillard’s, Nordstrom, Bon-Ton, The 
Gap and Limited Brands, to name a few….Our corporation is financially healthy. Our cash flow remains 
strong.” Macy’s shares jumped 3.8% on Monday, 7/14/08, while the broader retail market declined. 
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Because other forces may be at work in the information environment that affect the baseline 
symmetry in the response to earnings news, this hypothesis is stated in relative comparison to 
the baseline response to earnings news observed in the absence of intra-industry bankruptcy 
(e.g., if there exists negative asymmetry in the response to non-bankruptcy-wake earnings 
news, H2 suggests that the negative asymmetry is stronger for bankruptcy-wake earnings 
news). 
3. Empirical setting, sample selection and data 
3.1. Empirical setting 
 My empirical strategy is to compare the market reaction to bankruptcy-wake earnings 
announcements vis-à-vis the corresponding reaction for non-bankruptcy-wake earnings 
announcements. Accordingly, a key ingredient of my setting is the definition of “bankruptcy-
wake.” Given the lack of theory or empirical evidence concerning post-announcement effects 
of intra-industry bankruptcy, it is unclear how long any information processing effects will 
persist. A relatively short window is necessary to minimize the incidence of confounding 
events between a bankruptcy and a particular earnings announcement under study. 
Conversely, the definition of bankruptcy-wake must be broad enough to achieve a reasonable 
sample size of bankruptcy-wake earnings announcements. With these competing 
considerations in mind, I classify a given earnings announcement as a bankruptcy-wake 
announcement if there was at least one intra-industry bankruptcy during the thirty calendar 
days immediately preceding the earnings announcement date, where industries are defined 
according to the Fama-French 48 classification (Fama and French, 1997).7
                                                          
7 Experimentation with variations in the length of this window ranging from 10 to 45 days does not change the 
tenor of the primary results reported below. 
 In complementary 
fashion, I classify an earnings announcement as a non-bankruptcy-wake announcement if 
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there were no intra-industry bankruptcies during the thirty calendar days immediately 
preceding the earnings announcement date.   
3.2. Data and sample selection 
 I compile a broad sample of Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings from SDC Platinum, 
which contains data for Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings beginning in 1980. Specifically, I 
begin with all initial firm bankruptcy filing observations in SDC where the filing date is 
between January 1, 1980 and June 30, 2007. I then delete all bankruptcy filings for which I 
cannot obtain an industry identifier from Compustat (dnum), leaving a sample of 1,873 
Chapter 11 bankruptcies.8
 I obtain all quarterly earnings announcements from Compustat that have a valid 
CRSP-Compustat link and a non-missing earnings announcement date in Compustat (rdqe). 
Using the bankruptcy sample, I delete all earnings announcements for bankruptcy filers that 
occur after their bankruptcy filing date. I further delete all earnings announcements where the 
three-day period centered on the earnings announcement date overlaps with any three-day 
period centered on an intra-industry bankruptcy announcement. Next, I categorize each 
earnings announcement as either a bankruptcy-wake earnings announcement (hereafter 
denoted BWi,t = 1), or a non-bankruptcy-wake earnings announcement (hereafter denoted 
BWi,t = 0).
  
9
                                                          
8 I link SDC to CRSP using both the CRSPQ and CUSIP master files. If an exact name match does not exist, I 
manually search for matches using the CUSIP lookup function on the CRSP-Compustat merged database. I also 
delete some observations where the accuracy of the SDC filing date is in question, after failed attempts to 
validate the suspect dates via www.bankruptcydata.com. Additional details are available upon request. 
 I delete all observations for firms that are not present for at least one firm-quarter 
observation in both the BW = 0 and BW = 1 partitions, so that the partitions are comprised of 
identical firm sets. 
 
9 The subscript i indexes firm, and the subscript t indexes quarter. Hereafter, I frequently suppress the i,t 
subscript when referring to variables measured at the firm-quarter level for expositional simplicity. 
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 Unless otherwise noted, accounting and stock price data used in the study are 
obtained from Compustat and CRSP, respectively (hereafter, data## refers to a Compustat 
variable). I delete observations without data necessary to compute all variables used in my 
empirical specifications, as well as several control and partitioning variables. Specifically, I 
require each firm-quarter observation to have non-missing data for seasonally differenced 
quarterly earnings per share before extraordinary items (data19), fiscal quarter-end stock 
price (data14), fiscal quarter-end common shares outstanding (data61), book value of 
common equity (data59), total liabilities (data54), CRSP stock price two trading days prior 
to the earnings announcement date, CRSP return for the three trading days centered on the 
earnings announcement date, and the level of the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
Volatility Index (VIX) two trading days prior to the earnings announcement date.10
 To minimize the effects of market frictions, I delete observations having stock price 
less than $1 two trading days prior to the earnings announcement date (Ball, Kothari and 
Shanken, 1993). Following prior literature (e.g. Collins, Maydew and Weiss, 1997; Kothari 
and Shanken, 2003), I delete observations with negative book value of equity to avoid 
capturing effects that may be related to extreme financial distress. Finally, I truncate test and 
 I further 
require observations in the BW = 1 partition to have non-missing CRSP return for the three 
trading days centered on the announcement dates of intra-industry bankruptcy filings that 
occur in the thirty-day window preceding the earnings announcement. Also, I delete 
observations for which seasonally differenced earnings per share before extraordinary items 
equals zero, i.e., “no news” observations. 
                                                          
10 VIX, often referred to as the “fear index,” represents one measure of the market’s expectation of volatility 
over the next thirty day period. I obtain daily VIX data from http://www.cboe.com/micro/VIX/historical.aspx. 
Because VIX data are unavailable prior to 1986, my sample period is so constrained. 
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control variables defined below at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the effects of database 
errors and outlier observations. Experimentation with variations in these data restrictions 
does not change the tenor of the results reported below. The final sample consists of 274,658 
firm-quarter earnings announcement observations with report dates that range from January 
2, 1986 through June 20, 2007, where 44,987 earnings announcements are bankruptcy-wake 
earnings announcements (BW = 1), and 229,671 are not (BW = 0). Underlying the BW = 1 
earnings announcements are 1,585 distinct Chapter 11 bankruptcy announcements with filing 
dates that range from December 6, 1985 through June 11, 2007. Of the 1,585 bankrupt firms, 
323, 202, and 1,060 were last listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ, respectively. 
3.3.  Descriptive statistics 
 Figure 1 presents the frequency of sample bankruptcies by calendar year. Consistent 
with prior literature (e.g., Beaver, McNichols, and Rhie, 2005), bankruptcies are relatively 
frequent in the years surrounding 1990 and 2000. Figure 2 presents the distribution of sample 
bankruptcies by Fama-French 48 industry classification, and reveals that the bankruptcy 
sample spans a wide range of industries.11
 Panels A and B of Table 1 present descriptive statistics for the non-bankruptcy-wake 
(BW = 0) and bankruptcy wake (BW = 1) earnings announcements, respectively. 
Interestingly, although the BW = 0 and BW = 1 partitions are comprised of the identical set of 
firms, there are statistically significant differences in mean values of most firm-level 
variables. However, most differences appear to be economically insignificant. The overall 
 Consistent with prior research, the sample 
includes a large number of bankruptcies in the retail and business services industries (e.g., 
Chava and Jarrow, 2004).  
                                                          
11 Industries not represented are Candy & Soda (FF48 category 3) and Tobacco Products (FF48 category 5). 
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distributional statistics reveal that the two partitions are quite similar along most firm-level 
dimensions. However, there is a notable difference across partitions for VIX. In particular, the 
VIX distribution is shifted to the right for the BW = 1 partition relative to the BW = 0 partition 
(e.g., median of 22.5 versus 18.8), suggesting a positive association between incidence of 
bankruptcy and market-level uncertainty. 
4. Research design 
 To test the hypothesis that there is a weaker on-average response to news in 
bankruptcy-wake earnings announcements as compared to that for non-bankruptcy-wake 
earnings announcements (H1), I estimate the following regression model via ordinary least 
squares: 
 , 0 1 , 2 , 3 , , ,* ,i t i t i t i t k i t i tCAR BW NEWS BW NEWS CONTROLα α α α α γ= + + + + +∑  (1) 
where BW is an indicator variable that equals one if firm i’s earnings announcement in 
quarter t is a bankruptcy-wake earnings announcement and equals zero otherwise, NEWS is 
seasonally differenced quarterly earnings per share before extraordinary items (data19) 
scaled by firm i’s stock price two trading days prior to the earnings announcement date 
(Christie, 1987), and CAR is the cumulative abnormal return, i.e. daily return less the CRSP 
value-weighted return, for firm i during the 3-day trading window centered on its quarter t 
earnings announcement date.12 3α A significantly negative coefficient would provide 
evidence, consistent with H1, that there is a smaller on-average response to earnings news for 
bankruptcy-wake earnings announcements.  
 To test the hypothesis that there is negative asymmetry in the stock price response to 
earnings news for bankruptcy-wake earnings announcements relative to non-bankruptcy-
                                                          
12 As discussed in Section 5.5., results are robust to alternative definitions of NEWS and CAR. 
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wake earnings announcements (H2), I estimate the following regression, which allows for a 
differential response to bad versus good earnings news, via ordinary least squares: 
 , 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,
6 , 7 , , ,
* *
* * * ,
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t k i t i t
CAR BAD NEWS BAD NEWS BW BW BAD
BW NEWS BW BAD NEWS CONTROL
β β β β β β
β β β ε
= + + + + +
+ + + +∑
 (2) 
where BAD is an indicator variable that equals one if NEWS is less than zero and equals zero 
otherwise, and all other variables are as previously defined. This specification permits the 
slope on NEWS to differ conditional on the sign of earnings news, and conditional on 
whether earnings news is released in the wake of intra-industry bankruptcy. The test of H2 
focuses on the sign and significance of 7β , which estimates the effect of bankruptcy on the 
incremental response coefficient for bad news versus good news. That is, 7β estimates 
directly the degree of negative asymmetry in the response to earnings news introduced by 
intra-industry bankruptcy. Finding a significantly positive 7β coefficient would provide 
evidence, consistent with H2, that bankruptcy induces negative asymmetry in the stock price 
response to intra-industry earnings news, relative to the baseline level of asymmetry for non-
bankruptcy wake earnings news.13
 I include several control variables in all specifications. First, following Conrad et al. 
(2002), I include size (SIZE), measured as the natural log of the quarter-end market value of 
common equity (data14*data61), to control for risk differences not reflected in abnormal 
return (Fama and French, 1993) and for potential scale differences (Barth and Kallapur, 
1996). I also include leverage (LEV), measured as total liabilities divided by book equity 
(data54/data59), to further control for the risk of financial distress and leverage effects (e.g., 
 
                                                          
13 In Appendix B, I outline the empirical modeling through which I determine the necessary interaction 
variables to include in this specification. 
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Christie, 1982). Next, I include the cumulative abnormal return, i.e., daily firm return less the 
CRSP value-weighted market return, for firm i over the period beginning two trading days 
after the report date of earnings for quarter t-1 and ending two trading days prior to the report 
date of earnings for quarter t (PRECAR) as a control for information associated with recent 
events prior to earnings announcement that may affect measurement error in NEWS (Brown, 
Griffin, Hagerman, and Zmijewski, 1987). When estimating the asymmetric specification in 
Eq. (2), I also include an indicator variable, BADPRE, that equals one if PRECAR is less than 
zero and equals zero otherwise, and the associated interaction BADPRE*PRECAR, to 
accommodate the possibility that investors react asymmetrically to news received in the pre-
earnings announcement period.  
 I control for the effects of macroeconomic uncertainty throughout my analyses. 
Otherwise, any effects I attribute to intra-industry bankruptcy may instead be the result of a 
higher level of uncertainty present in the macro-environment. The necessity of this control is 
apparent for two reasons. First, Table 1 reveals a correlation between the incidence of 
bankruptcy and macro-level uncertainty, as captured by VIX. Second, Williams (2009) 
provides evidence that increases in VIX (that study’s proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty) 
are associated with negative asymmetry in the stock price response to earnings news, where 
the effect is particularly strong during periods of high VIX. I construct an indicator HVIX that 
equals one if VIX is above the sample median, and equals zero otherwise, where VIX is the 
level of VIX two trading days prior to firm i’s earnings announcement date. I include HVIX 
(and associated interactions with NEWS) in any specification where BW (and associated 
interactions with NEWS) enters the regression model, to control for both the mean effect of 
the level of uncertainty in the macro-environment and its effect on the response to earnings 
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news. Finally, I include year fixed effects based on earnings announcement dates to control 
for time clustering of bankruptcies, and cluster standard errors at the firm level (Petersen, 
2009). 
 When testing alternative explanations and cross-sectional effects, I use either control 
variables or sample partitioning schemes. When partitioning structures permit, I test the 
significance of coefficient differences across partitions using untabulated four-way 
interaction specifications. Otherwise, I employ Monte Carlo randomization tests. I identify 
the method used when I discuss the associated test results. I present a description of the 
Monte Carlo randomization test methodology in Appendix C. 
5. Empirical analyses and results 
5.1. On-average response to bankruptcy-wake earnings news 
 Table 2 presents the results of estimating Eq. (1). Consistent with the large earnings 
response literature, there is a strong positive relation between earnings news and the 
cumulative abnormal return over the earnings announcement window, as shown in model (1). 
Model (2) reveals that when I allow the response to news to vary based on bankruptcy-wake 
partitioning, there is a significant negative coefficient (−0.060) on the interaction variable 
BW*NEWS (t-stat of −6.18). That is, the on-average response to earnings news is weaker for 
bankruptcy-wake earnings announcements than for non-bankruptcy-wake earnings 
announcements. Model (3) documents that high levels of macroeconomic uncertainty are 
associated with a significantly diminished response to earnings news, as evidenced by the 
significant negative coefficient on HVIX*NEWS. Critically, the coefficient on BW*NEWS 
remains strongly negative (−0.048 with a t-stat of −4.80), which provides evidence that intra-
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industry bankruptcy contagion effects are incremental to those related to overarching 
macroeconomic uncertainty.  
 These results provide evidence consistent with H1, and suggest that there is an 
increase in the assessed default risk for surviving firms in the wake of intra-industry 
bankruptcy of sufficient magnitude to affect the equity market information processing 
environment. However, these results do not reveal whether the diminished response to 
earnings news results from symmetrically decreased responses to both good and bad news, or 
reflects the net effect of asymmetry in the response to good news relative to bad news.  
5.2. Asymmetry in the response to bankruptcy-wake earnings news 
 Table 3 presents results of estimating Eq. (2). As reported in model (1), there exists a 
significant negative asymmetry in the full sample of earnings announcements, as indicated by 
the positive coefficient of 0.028 on NEWS*BAD (t-stat of 2.84). However, model (2) 
provides evidence that there is a symmetric response to bad versus good earnings news for 
non-bankruptcy-wake earnings announcements, as indicated by the insignificant coefficient 
(0.0046) on NEWS*BAD (t-stat of 0.42). In sharp contrast, consistent with H2 there exists a 
marked negative asymmetry in the response to bankruptcy-wake earnings announcements, as 
indicated by the significantly positive coefficient on BW*BAD*NEWS of 0.090 (t-stat of 
4.13). 
 Interestingly, the negative asymmetry appears to result almost entirely from a 
diminished response to good news for bankruptcy-wake earnings announcements, as 
reflected by the −0.096 coefficient on BW*NEWS (t-stat of −5.66). The total incremental bad 
news coefficient for bankruptcy-wake earnings announcements of −0.006 is insignificantly 
different from zero (p-value of 0.66), suggesting that the response to bad news has an equal 
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magnitude for both bankruptcy-wake and non-bankruptcy wake earnings announcements. 
Model (3) reports results after inclusion of controls for market-level uncertainty. Inferences 
are unaltered relative to those obtained from model (2). There is a significantly negative 
coefficient on HVIX*NEWS of −0.027 (t-stat of −1.85), which indicates that the response to 
good news is further suppressed in periods of high macroeconomic uncertainty. However, the 
insignificant coefficient on HVIX*BAD*NEWS of 0.009 provides evidence that, after 
controlling for asymmetry induced by intra-industry bankruptcy, macroeconomic uncertainty 
does not induce asymmetry in the market response to firm-level bad versus good earnings 
news. 
 These results appear partially inconsistent with theories of model uncertainty. 
Whereas model uncertainty suggests that negative asymmetry arises from both a decreased 
response to good news and an increased response to bad news, I find a decrease in the good 
news response in the wake of bankruptcy with no apparent effect on the bad news response. 
However, this interpretation does not consider the potential co-existence of downward 
pressure on earnings news in general because of the on-average effect of increased default 
risk on earnings responses (e.g., Barth et al. 1998). It is possible that contagion-induced 
model uncertainty causes both a decreased response to good news and an increased response 
to bad news, which are then each shifted downward as a result of an on-average decrease in 
investor sensitivity to earnings news arising from the increase in perceived default risk. 
Although the observed results are consistent with that combination of forces, my research 
design cannot disentangle these interpretations. 
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5.3. Managerial preemptive good news disclosure 
 To test whether the observed negative asymmetry is related to voluntary managerial 
disclosure of good news in the wake of intra-industry bankruptcy, I create a proxy for the 
likelihood of such disclosure using the magnitude and direction of firm-level abnormal stock 
return in the window between bankruptcy announcement and earnings announcement. 
Specifically, for each bankruptcy-wake earnings announcement, I compute the earnings 
announcer’s cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return between the end of the relevant 
three-day bankruptcy announcement window and the beginning of the three-day earnings 
announcement window (DOBEA_CAR). I then separately estimate Eq. (2) for the non-
bankruptcy-wake earnings announcements pooled with each of two sub-partitions of the BW 
= 1 earnings announcements: the first quartile of DOBEA_CAR, i.e., DOBEA_CAR less than 
−0.040, and the fourth quartile of DOBEA_CAR, i.e., DOBEA_CAR greater than 0.037. If 
managers issue voluntary good news disclosures in the wake of intra-industry bankruptcy 
that elicit a positive market response of sufficient magnitude to suppress the response to good 
news at subsequent earnings announcement, it is unlikely (most likely) that any such 
disclosures are issued for observations within the first (fourth) quartile of DOBEA_CAR. 
 As reported in Table 4, there exists pronounced negative asymmetry in the response 
to earnings news for earnings announcements released in both the first and fourth quartiles of 
DOBEA_CAR ( 7βˆ of 0.076 and 0.173, with t-stats of 2.04 and 4.69, respectively). Monte 
Carlo randomization tests indicate that the negative asymmetry is greater in the fourth 
quartile than in the first quartile (one-tailed p-value of 0.029), consistent with contagion-
induced preemptive disclosure of good news exacerbating negative asymmetry in the 
response to bankruptcy-wake earnings news. However, because there exists significant 
25 
 
negative asymmetry in the first DOBEA_CAR quartile (where preemptive disclosure of good 
news is least likely to have occurred), preemptive disclosure of good news does not appear to 
be a complete explanation for the on-average asymmetry.  
5.4. Additional analyses based on contagion intensity 
5.4.1. Industry health 
 Within the BW = 1 earnings announcements, there exists variation in the number of 
intra-industry bankruptcies within the thirty-day window preceding a given earnings 
announcement. In this section, I exploit this variation to examine whether my results are 
related to the broader health of a given industry. Lang and Stulz (1992) provides evidence 
that contagion effects are intensified during periods of multiple intra-industry bankruptcies, 
consistent with the interpretation that during such times, bankruptcy is more likely caused by 
industry-wide shocks rather than idiosyncratic factors. If the information processing effects I 
document are associated with contagion, I therefore expect that the negative asymmetry in 
the response to bankruptcy-wake earnings news is exacerbated when earnings 
announcements follow multiple intra-industry bankruptcies. To test this prediction, I estimate 
Eq. (2) separately for the BW = 0 earnings announcements pooled with each of two sub-
partitions of the BW = 1 earnings announcements. The first (second) sub-partition contains 
earnings announcements released in the wake of single (multiple) intra-industry bankruptcies 
(NBANK = 1 and NBANK >1, respectively). 
 Table 5 reports a significant reduction in the response to news for earnings 
announcements released in the wake of both single and multiple intra-industry bankruptcies 
( 6βˆ  of −0.058 and −0.164, with t-stats of −2.96 and −5.61, respectively). Table 5 further 
reveals significant negative asymmetry in the response to earnings news released in the wake 
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of both single and multiple intra-industry bankruptcies ( 7βˆ  of 0.054 and 0.167, with t-stats of 
2.12 and 4.47, respectively). These results provide evidence that the bankruptcy effects on 
the market response to earnings news obtain in periods of both relatively good and poor 
industry health. Importantly, both the decrease in the response to news and the negative 
asymmetry in the NBANK > 1 sub-partition are significantly greater than those for the 
NBANK = 1 sub-partition, as determined by Monte Carlo randomization tests (one-tailed p-
values of 0.001 and 0.011, respectively). This finding reinforces the contagion-based 
explanation, and is consistent with evidence in Lang and Stulz (1992) that contagion effects 
are more pronounced when there are multiple industry bankruptcies. 
5.4.2. Intra-industry economic comparability 
 Research that investigates intra-industry effects of bankruptcy is based on the premise 
that any such effects will most likely be felt by related firms, where industry membership is 
used as a proxy for relatedness. However, there exists variation in economic comparability 
across firms within a given industry. Lang and Stulz (1992) and Jorion and Zhang (2007) 
provide evidence that contagion is most pronounced when industry peers have relatively high 
economic comparability, i.e., similar investments and cash flow patterns, with the bankrupt 
firm. Similarly, I expect industry-level contagion effects to be more pronounced for firms 
with tighter economic connections to their industry peers. To test whether my results vary 
predictably with economic comparability, I follow Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) and 
compute a stock return synchronicity measure from the following time-series regression, 
estimated by firm-quarter using data from the 36 months immediately prior to firm i’s fiscal 
quarter t ending date: 
 , 0 1 , ,i m m i mRET VWFFRETγ γ ν= + +  (3) 
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where RETi,m is the return for firm i in month m obtained from the CRSP monthly file, and 
VWFFRETm is the value-weighted return on firm i’s Fama-French 48 industry category in 
month m.14 My measure of economic comparability is the adjusted-R2 obtained from 
estimating Eq. (3), where a large adjusted-R2 reflects high economic comparability. I then 
separately estimate Eq. (2) for two earnings announcement sub-partitions: those with 
adjusted-R2 below the sample median, and those with adjusted-R2 above the sample 
median.15
 As reported in Table 6, there is significant bankruptcy-induced negative asymmetry in 
the response to earnings news for firms with both low and high within-industry economic 
comparability (
  
7βˆ  of 0.057 and 0.128, with t-stats of 1.84 and 3.87, respectively). More 
critically for this analysis, tests based on a four-way interaction specification provide 
evidence that the negative asymmetry for the high economic comparability observations is 
greater than that for the low economic comparability observations (one-tailed p-value = 
0.055).  
5.4.3. Surviving firm financial health 
 Because contagion effects relate to cross-firm default risk reassessments, it is likely 
that contagion effects are mitigated for surviving firms in relatively good financial health. To 
test this conjecture, I estimate Eq. (2) separately for sub-partitions of earnings 
announcements based on the earnings announcers’ own financial health. 
                                                          
14 I obtain the monthly returns for the Fama-French 48 industry groups from Kenneth French’s website at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
 
15 I remove firm-quarter observations with fewer than twelve monthly observations available to estimate Eq. (3), 
reducing my overall sample size to 265,245 for this analysis. 
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 To measure financial health, I loosely follow Piotroski (2000) and give each of three 
firm-level fundamental signals an indicator equal to one (zero) if the signal is “good” 
(“bad”), and then sum the indicators to create an aggregate financial health measure 
(HSCORE), where higher scores correspond to better financial health. Specifically, I use the 
following three variables: CFO, defined as cash flow from operations (data108); LEVER, 
defined as long-term debt (data51) divided by total assets (data44); LIQUID, defined as 
current assets (data40) divided by current liabilities (data49). I code HCFO equal to one if 
CFO is greater than zero, and code HLIQUID (HLEVER) equal to one if the associated firm-
quarter signal realization is greater than (less than) the industry-fiscal-quarter median signal 
realization, and equal to zero otherwise. I then compute HSCORE as the sum of HCFO, 
HLIQUID, and HLEVER. Accordingly, HSCORE ranges from 0 to 3, where higher HSCORE 
indicates better health. 
 As reported in Table 7, there is a significant reduction in the response to news for 
bankruptcy-wake earnings announcements for the sets of firms with low and medium 
financial health ( 6βˆ of −0.072 and −0.102, with t-stats of −2.54 and −3.21, respectively), as 
categorized by the partitions HSCORE = {0, 1} and HSCORE = {2}. Table 7 further reveals 
significant negative asymmetry in the response to bankruptcy-wake earnings news for these 
firms ( 7βˆ  of 0.077 and 0.094, with t-stats of 2.12 and 2.27, respectively). In sharp contrast, 
there is neither a reduction in the response to news nor negative asymmetry in the response 
for bankruptcy-wake earnings announcements of firms with high financial health (HSCORE 
= {3}). Specifically, the coefficients on BW*NEWS and BW*BAD*NEWS are insignificantly 
different from zero (t-stats of −1.50 and 0.04, respectively). These results provide evidence 
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that the bankruptcy effects on the market response to intra-industry earnings news are 
mitigated for firms with relatively good financial health, consistent with a diminished 
contagion effect. It is also noteworthy that the response to news is monotonically increasing 
in financial health, consistent with the logic that investors place less weight on earnings the 
poorer is a firm’s financial health (Barth et al., 1998).  
5.5. Alternative explanations for bankruptcy-wake negative asymmetry 
5.5.1. Contagion-induced earnings management 
 Managers of surviving firms may have incentives to inflate reported earnings in the 
wake of intra-industry bankruptcy in an attempt to offset pessimistic market assessments of 
default risk. Of course, such behavior would reflect an assumption on the part of managers 
that the market cannot see through earnings management (e.g., Xie, 2001). However, DeFond 
and Park (2001) concludes that market participants adjust for suspected earnings 
management at the time of an earnings announcement. Specifically, that study finds that the 
market response to good (bad) news is stronger for firms reporting income-decreasing 
(income-increasing) accruals versus income-increasing (income-decreasing) accruals. Those 
results imply negative asymmetry in the response to earnings news that contains income-
increasing accruals, ceteris paribus. If investors expect managers to inflate earnings in the 
wake-of intra-industry bankruptcy, investors may further discount reported good news that is 
arrived at through income-increasing accruals, leading to an exacerbated negative asymmetry 
in the response to such earnings news. 
 To examine whether investor perception of earnings management is a plausible 
explanation for the asymmetry documented in Table 3, I incorporate a simple measure of 
upwards earnings management into the analysis. I first compute firm-quarter accruals (ACC) 
30 
 
by subtracting cash flow from operations (data108) from net income (data69). I then create 
an indicator variable, POSACC, which equals one if ACC is greater than zero and equals zero 
otherwise.16 Table 3 indicates that there is a similar proportion of bad news earnings 
announcements across the BW = 0 and BW = 1 partitions (0.44 and 0.46, respectively). 
Moreover, untabulated tests reveal that the proportion of earnings announcements that 
include upwards earnings management is statistically indistinguishable across the BW = 0 
and BW = 1 partitions (0.304 and 0.307, respectively). Therefore, univariate evidence 
suggests that managers of surviving firms do not engage in upwards earnings manipulation in 
the wake of intra-industry bankruptcy. Untabulated results further confirm that inferences are 
unaltered after adding POSACC to Eq. (2) in an interactive fashion, i.e., POSACC, 
POSACC*BAD, POSACC*NEWS, and POSACC*BAD*NEWS.17
5.5.2. Torpedo effect 
  
 Skinner and Sloan (2002) provides empirical evidence that investors correct overly 
optimistic expectations for growth stocks when they see negative surprises in earnings 
announcements, which induces a negative asymmetric response to earnings news (hereafter 
referred to as the “torpedo effect”). If incidence of intra-industry bankruptcy makes it more 
likely that investors correct overly optimistic growth expectations for surviving firms, i.e., if 
the torpedo effect is more pronounced in the wake of intra-industry bankruptcy, asymmetry 
in the response to bankruptcy-wake earnings news could be related to torpedo effect 
dynamics. 
                                                          
16 Because statement of cash flows data are not available until 1987, for this test my sample is so constrained. 
 
17 As an alternate proxy for investor perception of earnings management, I replace POSACC with AMACC, 
where AMACC = 1 if ACCt is above the sample median ACC for the firm’s industry during the fiscal quarter for 
which earnings are reported, and = 0 otherwise. Untabulated results confirm that inferences are unchanged 
when I replace POSACC with the alternate proxy AMACC.  
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 To examine whether my results are related to the torpedo effect, I follow Skinner and 
Sloan (2002) and control for market-to-book ratio (MTB) as a proxy for growth, where I 
define MTB as quarter-end market value of common equity divided by book value of 
common equity (data14*data61/data59). I then estimate Eq. (2) after adding MTB in an 
interactive fashion, i.e., MTB, MTB *BAD, MTB *NEWS, and MTB *BAD*NEWS. 
Untabulated findings confirm that all previously reported inferences are robust to controls for 
the torpedo effect. 
5.5.3. Aggregate sentiment 
 Extending logic in Baker and Wurgler (2006), Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2007) 
finds that the stock price response to good (bad) earnings news that arrives during a high 
(low) aggregate sentiment period is stronger than the stock price response to good (bad) 
earnings news that arrives during a low (high) sentiment period. Although the aggregate 
sentiment literature does not directly predict a stronger stock price response to bad versus 
good news, it does imply that the response to bad news minus the response to good news, i.e., 
negative asymmetry, is greater in times of low sentiment than in times of high sentiment. 
Therefore, if a substantial proportion of bankruptcies occur in times of low sentiment, 
sentiment could explain my findings. 
 To control for aggregate sentiment, I use the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment 
index for the month during which firm i announced earnings for quarter t (SEN).18
                                                          
18 Please refer to Baker and Wurgler (2006) for details on computation of this monthly sentiment index. I obtain 
monthly sentiment index data from http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jwurgler/data/. Because the sentiment index is 
only available through December 2005, the sample for this analysis is so constrained. 
 I then 
estimate Eq. (2) after adding SEN in an interactive fashion, i.e., SEN, SEN*BAD, 
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SEN*NEWS, and SEN*BAD*NEWS. Untabulated findings confirm that previously reported 
inferences are robust to controls for investor sentiment.  
5.6. Robustness tests   
5.6.1. Earnings news and abnormal returns 
 It is unlikely that my results are driven by differential measurement error in NEWS 
across BW=0 and BW=1 partitions. First, as discussed above, I include controls for 
information arrival in the quarter prior to earnings announcement (PRECAR) in all empirical 
specifications (Brown et al., 1987). Second, the overall pattern of results makes it difficult to 
attach a measurement error interpretation. However, to further address this concern I examine 
whether my primary results are robust to an alternative definition of earnings news based on 
analyst forecasts.19 Specifically, I compute earnings news as quarterly I/B/E/S actual 
earnings less I/B/E/S consensus forecast for firm i in quarter t, where I compute consensus 
forecast as the mean of the most recent individual analyst forecasts issued during the 90-day 
window prior to earnings announcement.20
                                                          
19 Of course, problems exist with using analyst forecasts as a measure of investor earnings expectation, 
including analyst propensity to issue optimistically biased forecasts (e.g., Francis and Philbrick, 1993) and 
analyst herding (e.g., Trueman, 1994). 
 Further, I only include bankruptcy-wake 
observations where the most recent analyst forecast included in the consensus calculation 
was issued after the associated bankruptcy announcement. These restrictions result in a 
severe reduction of my sample size to 91,375 firm-quarter observations, only 6,866 of which 
are in the BW = 1 partition. Nonetheless, I find results consistent with the main findings 
reported above. Specifically, there is a significant on-average decrease, as well as significant 
 
20 Because there exists a regime shift in I/B/E/S data around 1991-1992 (Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2007), I begin 
my sample period for this test in 1993. 
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negative asymmetry, in the response to bankruptcy-wake earnings news when news is 
measured using analyst consensus forecasts. 
 One advantage of the short window tests used in this study is that, because daily 
expected returns are close to zero, the particular model I use for expected returns does not 
have a large effect on inferences about abnormal returns (Fama, 1998). However, to 
investigate the robustness of my results to an alternative measure of event window abnormal 
returns, I estimate a version of the market model used in Collins, Li, and Xie (2009), which 
would capture any shifts in equity beta that might be induced by periods of contagion. 
Specifically, I estimate market model abnormal returns (MMCAR) as the three-day 
cumulative market model residual centered on the earnings announcement date (day 0), 
where the market model parameters are estimated by regressing daily firm return on the 
value-weighted market return over the 80-day non-announcement period where day (d) 
varies from -45 to -6 and from day +6 to +45 relative to the quarterly earnings announcement 
date. Consistent with the logic in Fama (1998) that the choice of the expected return model 
used in short window studies is relatively unimportant, the correlation (untabulated) between 
CAR and MMCAR is 0.97. More importantly, all inferences in the study are unchanged when 
I use MMCAR in place of CAR.  
5.6.2. Sub-period analysis 
 Figure 3 plots the coefficients on good news ( 2βˆ ) and bad news ( 2 3ˆ ˆβ β+ ) obtained 
from estimating model (1) in Table 3 by calendar year of earnings announcement. 
Interestingly, there appears to be a downward structural shift in the magnitude of both 
coefficients in 2001 that is particularly pronounced for good news, followed by a period of 
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prominent negative asymmetry. In this section I consider whether my primary results are 
affected by this structural shift.  
  Untabulated results confirm that my primary results separately obtain in both the sub-
period 1986-2001 and 2002-2007. That is, there is a significant on-average decrease, as well 
as significant negative asymmetry, in the response to bankruptcy-wake earnings news 
relative to non-bankruptcy-wake earnings news in both sample sub-periods. Further, I 
confirm that my primary inferences are unaltered when I exclude 2001 data from the sample. 
5.6.3. Retail and business services industries 
 Consistent with prior literature, my sample includes a large number of bankruptcies 
from the business services and retail industries. Specifically, these two industries together 
account for 14,039 bankruptcy-wake earnings announcements (31% of all BW=1 
observations), but account for only 25,282 non-bankruptcy wake earnings announcements 
(11% of all BW=0 observations). To ensure that my results are not attributable to the 
disproportionate influence of these industries on the BW=1 partition, I repeat my main tests 
after exclusion of all observations in the business services and retail industries, and confirm 
that my inferences are unaltered. 
6. Conclusion  
 I provide novel evidence that intra-industry bankruptcy contagion affects the equity 
market response to news in surviving firms’ subsequent earnings announcements, where I 
use the term “contagion” to denote the phenomenon where a default by one firm increases 
the market’s assessment of the default risk of other firms. First, I hypothesize and find that 
intra-industry bankruptcy diminishes the response to surviving firms’ earnings news, 
consistent with the economic logic that increased default risk assessments lead to weaker 
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stock price reactions to earnings information (e.g., Subramanyam and Wild, 1996; Barth, 
Beaver, and Landsman, 1998). 
 Next, I investigate whether the effect of bankruptcy contagion on the response to 
intra-industry earnings news is asymmetric across bad and good news realizations. 
Interestingly, I find strong evidence that bankruptcy induces negative asymmetry in the 
response, i.e., a weaker response to good news relative to bad news, which appears to be 
driven primarily by a reduction in the response to good news. Results are consistent with a 
combination of model uncertainty-induced asymmetry and an on-average reduction in 
earnings informativeness stemming from increased perceived default risk. Results are further 
consistent with managerial preemptive disclosure of good news in the wake of intra-industry 
bankruptcy exacerbating, but not completely explaining, this asymmetry. I present evidence 
that the results vary predictably with sample partitioning schemes based on proxies for 
contagion intensity, and consider several alternative explanations for the results. The totality 
of evidence supports the interpretation that these effects are directly associated with intra-
industry bankruptcy contagion. 
 This study extends the literature that documents a number of cross-firm consequences 
of intra-industry bankruptcy. The key innovation of my study is the recognition that not only 
does intra-industry bankruptcy contagion have direct cross-firm consequences for prices 
(e.g., stocks, loans, credit default swaps), but it also fundamentally affects the industry 
information processing environment and alters the manner in which the equity market 
responds to subsequent news. 
 I utilize insights from the learning-from-default model of default correlation, and the 
updating of beliefs mechanism in particular, to formally develop the prediction that 
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contagion in the wake of intra-industry bankruptcy can affect subsequent equity market 
information processing. In particular, learning-from-default models posit that an observed 
bankruptcy can cause investors to update their beliefs about unobservable variables that 
affect other firms’ assessed default probabilities, which can affect the response to subsequent 
earnings news. However, because the learning-from-default models assume Bayesian 
updating processes, the response asymmetry that I document is difficult to explain within that 
framework. Therefore, my results suggest that the contagion-related belief updating 
mechanism is more complicated than that assumed by current models, which can inform the 
default risk correlation literature. 
 This study also contributes to the literature that examines how uncertainty in the firm- 
or market-level information environments affects the stock price response to firm-level 
earnings news (e.g., Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Conrad et al., 2002; Williams, 2009), by 
providing evidence that industry-level bankruptcy contagion is an independent driver of 
response asymmetry. More generally, extant earnings response studies have effectively 
ignored the possibility that the market response to firm-specific earnings news can be 
affected by intra-industry economic events. The results of this study suggest that this is a 
non-trivial omission. 
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Appendix A – Model uncertainty and information processing 
Economic theories of model uncertainty include the theory of ambiguity aversion 
(e.g., Epstein and Schneider, 2008) and robust control theory (e.g., Hansen and Sargent, 
2001), both of which use axioms of max-min utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) as their 
decision theoretic underpinning. Max-min utility is a generalization of the standard or 
subjective expected utility (SEU) model of decision making under uncertainty (e.g., von 
Neumann-Morgenstern, 1947; Savage, 1954) that is motivated by evidence (e.g., Ellsberg, 
1961) that investors do not always behave in accordance with these standard models. The key 
difference between the SEU and max-min-based models is that the SEU axioms assert that 
decision makers maximize expected utility with respect to a unique prior belief over relevant 
outcomes, whereas the max-min axioms assume that decision makers face a set of possible 
prior beliefs that cannot be reduced to unity.21
Epstein and Schneider (2008) develops a model describing how ambiguity-averse 
investors process ambiguous signals, where the ambiguity-averse investors behave in 
accordance with the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) axioms. Accordingly, ambiguity-averse 
investors act as if they solve for the decision rule that maximizes expected utility under each 
possible probability distribution within their range of signal likelihoods, and then apply the 
decision rule under which the minimum optimized expected utility is obtained. Because 
investors evaluate any action using the conditional probability that minimizes the utility of 
that action, they respond asymmetrically to ambiguous information. 
 
                                                          
21 Camerer and Weber (1992) and Kelsey and Quiggin (1992) provide surveys of the literature that uses max-
min utility theory, and its distinction from classical subjective expected utility and Bayesian decision theory. 
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As an example, suppose that an investor wants to learn about a certain fundamental 
parameterθ  (e.g., future economic earnings), where an ambiguous signal s (e.g., earnings 
announcement released in the wake of intra-industry bankruptcy) is related to θ  as follows: 
 
222 2, (0, ), , .sss ss Nθ ε ε σ σ σ σ = + ∈    
Also, assume that the investor has a unique prior distribution overθ , where 2( , )N m θθ σ . 
When the ambiguity-averse investor sees the ambiguous signal, she updates her prior as 
follows:  
 
2 2 2 222
2 2 2 2( ), , , .
s
sss
s s
N m s mθ θ
θ θ
σ σ σ
θ σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ
   + − ∈    + + 
  
 In particular, if the investor sees bad news (s < m), then 22 ssσ σ= , i.e., she views the signal as 
precise, and if the investor sees good news (s > m), then 
22
ssσ σ= , i.e., she acts as if the signal 
is imprecise.22
2
2 2
s
θ
θ
σ
σ σ+
 In the earnings announcement context, (s – m) represents unexpected 
earnings, and  represents the response coefficient. It follows directly that ambiguity-
averse investors will drive larger stock price responses for bad news relative to good news, 
i.e., negative asymmetry, for earnings announcements that are viewed as ambiguous. 
 The above example suggests that ambiguity takes the form of “ambiguity in signal 
quality.” However, the Epstein and Schneider (2008) model can be used to generate identical 
predictions if the ambiguity relates to volatility in fundamentals, i.e., “ambiguity in 
fundamentals”. That is, assume that the investor does not possess a unique prior distribution 
                                                          
22 In the standard Bayesian case, 2sσ takes on a unique value. 
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over the fundamental parameterθ , but rather
222 2( , ), ,N m θθθ θθ σ σ σ σ ∈    . Holding signal 
quality constant, if the investor then sees bad news (s < m), then 
22
θθσ σ= , i.e., she acts as if 
the signal is very informative about fundamentals, and if the investor sees good news (s > m), 
then 22 θθσ σ= , i.e., she acts as if the signal is not very informative about fundamentals. 
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Appendix B – Interaction specification  
 In this appendix, I outline the model structure that underlies the three-way interaction 
specification used in Eq. (2). At the most elementary level, the basic process behind my study 
is that abnormal return is a function of earnings news: 
(A1) ( )0 1 ,kCAR NEWS CONTROLα α α= + +∑   
where CONTROLs affect CAR, but are not modeled as having interactive effects with NEWS. 
I first conjecture that the sign of news affects this process, creating the secondary process 
(A2) ( )( )0 1 2 3 .kCAR NEWS BAD CONTROLα α α α α= + + +∑  
Algebraic expansion of (A2) leads to the following interactive model structure: 
 0 1 2 3 * .kCAR BAD NEWS BAD NEWS CONTROLθ θ θ θ α= + + + +∑  
Next, the premise of this paper is that bankruptcy affects (A2), creating the tertiary process 
(A3) 
( )( )( )
[ ]( )
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 1 2 3 4 5* .
k
k
CAR NEWS BAD BW CONTROL
BAD NEWS BAD NEWS BW CONTROL
α α α α α α α
θ θ θ θ α α α
= + + + +
= + + + + +
∑
∑
 
 Further algebraic expansion of (A3) leads to the following triple interactive structure:  
 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
*
* * * *
.
k
CAR BAD NEWS BAD NEWS
BW BW BAD BW NEWS BW BAD NEWS
CONTROL
δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ
α
= + + +
+ + + +
+∑
 
Controlling for the level of VIX as a competing explanation against BW alters (A3) as 
follows:  
(A4) ( )( )( )
[ ]( )
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6* ,
k
k
CAR NEWS BAD BW HVIX CONTROL
BAD NEWS BAD NEWS BW HVIX CONTROL
α α α α α α α α
θ θ θ θ α α α α
= + + + + +
= + + + + + +
∑
∑
 
where algebraic expansion leads to the following specification, which I estimate using Eq. 
(2): 
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0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11
*
* * * *
* * * *
.
k
CAR BAD NEWS BAD NEWS
BW BW BAD BW NEWS BW BAD NEWS
HVIX HVIX BAD HVIX NEWS HVIX BAD NEWS
CONTROL
β β β β
β β β β
β β β β
α
= + + +
+ + + +
+ + + +
+∑
 
Finally, in certain untabulated tests within the paper I use a four-way interaction specification 
to test the significance of coefficient differences across sample partitions. In other words, I 
model the possibility that a given partitioning variable affects the process in (A4), as follows: 
(A5) 
( )( )( ) ( )0 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11
*
* * * *
* * * *
k kk
k
CAR NEWS BAD BW HVIX CONTROL PART
BAD NEWS BAD NEWS
BW BW BAD BW NEWS BW BAD NEWS
HVIX HVIX BAD HVIX NEWS HVIX BAD NEWS
CONTROL
α α α α α α α α α α
β β β β
β β β β
β β β β
α
+ + = + + + + + + 
+ + + 
 + + + + =  + + + +
 
+ 
∑
∑
( )1 2 ,k k PARTα α+ ++

 
where PART is an indicator for a given sample partition. Algebraic expansion leads to the 
following four-way-interactive specification: 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15
16 17 18
*
* * * *
* * * *
* * * *
* * *
CAR BAD NEWS BAD NEWS
BW BW BAD BW NEWS BW BAD NEWS
HVIX HVIX BAD HVIX NEWS HVIX BAD NEWS
PART PART BAD PART NEWS PART BAD NEWS
PART BW PART BW BAD PART
γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ
= + + +
+ + + +
+ + + +
+ + + +
+ + + 19
20 21 22
23
* * * * *
* * * * *
* * * * .
k k
BW NEWS PART BW BAD NEWS
PART HVIX PART HVIX BAD PART HVIX NEWS
PART HVIX BAD NEWS CONTROL PART CONTROL
γ
γ γ γ
γ α γ
+
+ + +
+ + +∑ ∑
 
For example, a test of significance on 19γ provides a test of whether bankruptcy-induced 
negative asymmetry is different across the tested sample partitions.
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Appendix C – Monte Carlo randomization test methodology 
 It is straightforward to use Monte Carlo randomization to test whether a coefficient 
estimate is statistically greater for sample partition B than sample partition A. To illustrate, I 
use the example of testing the difference in the coefficient estimate for BW*BAD*NEWS 
across sample partitions as in Table 5, although the methodology is generalizable to any 
cross-partition test statistic. In step one, I compute the relevant test statistic (DIFF) as the 
estimated coefficient in partition B (e.g., NBANK > 1) minus the estimated coefficient in 
partition A (e.g., NBANK = 1), where each coefficient is obtained from estimation of Eq. (2) 
on the actual sample partitions. In step two, from the original NBW=1 (44,987) observations in 
my data set I randomly assign n1 (the original number of NBANK > 1 observations, i.e., 
8,233) observations without replacement to a random NBANK* > 1 partition, leaving the 
NBW=1 sample complement of n2 (36,754) randomly assigned observations as the 
corresponding NBANK* = 1 partition, and combine each randomly permuted NBANK* 
partition with the actual 229,671 BW=0 observations (which remain constant across 
partitions). In Step Three, I estimate equation (2) for each of the randomly permuted sample 
partitions, and compute the difference in the BW*BAD*NEWS coefficient estimates across 
the permuted partitions (DIFF*). I then repeat Steps Two and Three 1,000 times. The one-
tailed p-value of the test of whether DIFF is greater than zero, i.e., whether the coefficient 
estimate on BW*BAD*NEWS in partition B is greater than that in partition A, is calculated as 
the proportion of the 1,000 sampled permutations where DIFF* > DIFF.23
 
  
                                                          
23 For more details concerning the theory and technical details behind randomization testing, see Edgington and 
Onghena (2007). 
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Panel A - Non-Bankruptcy Wake Earnings Announcements  (BW i,t  = 0)
Variables N Mean Std Min P25 Median P75 Max
CARi,t 229,671 0.002 0.066 -0.307 -0.031 0.000 0.032 0.346
NEWS i,t 229,671 -0.002 0.040 -0.566 -0.008 0.001 0.007 0.499
SIZE i,t 229,671 5.499 1.878 1.009 4.085 5.396 6.825 11.308
MTBi,t 229,671 2.589 2.524 0.245 1.246 1.836 2.951 39.751
LEV i,t 229,671 2.625 3.767 0.033 0.523 1.196 2.522 28.297
PRECARi,t 229,671 0.004 0.188 -0.664 -0.102 -0.010 0.090 2.102
VIX t 229,671 20.057 7.893 9.490 14.180 18.760 23.980 113.330
Panel B - Bankruptcy Wake Earnings Announcements (BW i,t  = 1)
Variables N Mean Std Min P25 Median P75 Max
CARi,t 44,987 0.002 0.074 -0.306 -0.035 0.000 0.037 0.346
NEWS i,t 44,987 -0.003
*** 0.052 -0.567 -0.010 0.001 0.007 0.500
SIZE i,t 44,987 5.409
*** 1.883 1.026 3.972 5.282 6.708 11.281
MTBi,t 44,987 2.578 2.747 0.245 1.153 1.766 2.930 39.291
LEV i,t 44,987 2.586
** 3.854 0.034 0.482 1.108 2.424 27.775
PRECARi,t 44,987 0.011
*** 0.219 -0.666 -0.114 -0.006 0.110 2.059
VIX t 44,987 22.817
*** 7.851 9.490 17.000 22.540 26.750 113.330
Panel C - Pearson correlation matrix - BW =0 (BW =1) above (below) the diagonal
CARi,t NEWS i,t SIZE i,t MTBi,t LEV i,t PRECARi,t VIX t
CARi,t 0.117 0.013 -0.013 0.006 -0.037 0.002
NEWS i,t 0.094 0.042 0.043 -0.005 0.109 -0.014
SIZE i,t 0.014 0.046 0.221 0.060 0.049 -0.069
MTBi,t -0.017 0.045 0.257 -0.054 0.098 -0.029
LEV i,t 0.012 -0.009 0.042 -0.043 0.015 0.009
PRECARi,t -0.026 0.113 0.057 0.097 0.010 -0.010
VIX t 0.007 -0.009 -0.027 -0.039 0.112 -0.013
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panels A and B of Table 1 present descriptive statistics for key variables used in the study. Panel C presents a 
Pearson correlation matrix, where correlations for the BW=0 (BW=1) partition are presented above (below) the 
diagonal, and correlations significant at the 0.05 level or better are presented in bold italics. BW is an indicator 
variable = 1 if there was at least one intra-industry bankruptcy in the thirty calendar days immediately preceding 
firm i’s quarter t earnings announcement and = 0 otherwise. Tests of differences in means across BW partitions 
are indicated in Panel B, where *, **, and *** indicate a significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (two-
tailed), respectively. CAR is firm i’s three-day cumulative abnormal return centered on its quarter t earnings 
announcement. NEWS is firm i’s seasonally differenced quarterly earnings per share scaled by stock price two 
trading days prior to quarter t earnings announcement. SIZE is the natural log of firm i’s quarter t market value 
of common equity. MTB is firm i’s market-to-book ratio at the end of quarter t. LEV is firm i’s total liabilities 
divided by book equity at the end of quarter t. PRECAR is firm i’s cumulative abnormal return beginning two 
trading days after its quarter t-1 earnings announcement and ending two trading days prior to its quarter t 
earnings announcement. VIX is the level of the VIX index two trading days prior to firm i’s quarter t earnings 
announcement.  
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Dependent Variable: CARi,t
(1) (2) (3)
Parameter Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat
Intercept -0.0033 *** (- 3.63) -0.0033 *** (- 3.58) -0.0032 *** (- 3.51)
NEWS 0.1861 *** ( 42.23) 0.2011 *** ( 39.96) 0.2421 *** ( 35.68)
BW -0.0002 (- 0.54) -0.0002 (- 0.49)
BW*NEWS -0.0603 *** (- 6.18) -0.0476 *** (- 4.80)
HVIX 0.0011 ** ( 2.23)
HVIX*NEWS -0.0650 *** (- 7.71)
SIZE 0.0005 *** ( 6.38) 0.0005 *** ( 6.36) 0.0005 *** ( 6.33)
LEV 0.0001 *** ( 4.07) 0.0001 *** ( 4.06) 0.0001 *** ( 4.08)
PRECAR -0.0175 *** (- 19.42) -0.0175 *** (- 19.44) -0.0176 *** (- 19.54)
Fixed Effects Year Year Year
Clustered SE Firm Firm Firm
N BW=0 229,671 229,671 229,671
N BW=1 44,987 44,987 44,987
R 2 0.016 0.016 0.017
Table 2: Market response to earnings news in the wake of intra-industry bankruptcy  
 
Table 2 presents results from OLS estimation of the following model using firm-quarter earnings 
announcements over the period 1986-2007:  
 , 0 1 , 2 , 3 , , ,*i t i t i t i t k i t i tCAR BW NEWS BW NEWS CONTROLα α α α α γ= + + + + +∑  (1) 
Year fixed effects are based on calendar year of earnings announcement. BW is an indicator variable that = 1 if 
there was at least one intra-industry bankruptcy in the thirty calendar days immediately preceding firm i’s 
quarter t earnings announcement and = 0 otherwise. CAR is firm i’s three-day cumulative abnormal return 
centered on its quarter t earnings announcement date. NEWS is firm i’s seasonally differenced quarterly 
earnings per share scaled by stock price two trading days prior to quarter t earnings announcement. HVIX is an 
indicator variable that =1 if VIX is above the sample median value and = 0 otherwise, where VIX is the level of 
the VIX index two trading days prior to firm i’s quarter t earnings announcement. SIZE is the natural log of firm 
i’s quarter t market value of common equity. LEV is firm i’s total liabilities divided by book equity at the end of 
quarter t. PRECAR is firm i’s cumulative abnormal return beginning two trading days after its quarter t-1 
earnings announcement and ending two trading days prior to quarter t earnings announcement. *, **, and *** 
denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
50 
 
Dependent Variable: CARi,t
(1) (2) (3)
Parameter Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat
Intercept 0.0056 *** ( 5.73) 0.0052 *** ( 5.31) 0.0053 *** ( 5.37)
BAD -0.0175 *** (- 54.32) -0.0172 *** (- 49.43) -0.0174 *** (- 41.19)
NEWS 0.0730 *** ( 9.60) 0.0977 *** ( 11.57) 0.1149 *** ( 10.02)
NEWS*BAD 0.0279 *** ( 2.84) 0.0046 ( 0.42) 0.0000 ( 0.00)
BW 0.0016 *** ( 2.98) 0.0017 *** ( 2.99)
BW*BAD -0.0016 * (- 1.92) -0.0017 ** (- 2.02)
BW*NEWS -0.0960 *** (- 5.66) -0.0902 *** (- 5.23)
BW*BAD*NEWS 0.0901 *** ( 4.13) 0.0874 *** ( 3.93)
HVIX 0.0010 * ( 1.78)
HVIX*BAD 0.0008 ( 1.28)
HVIX*NEWS -0.0269 * (- 1.85)
HVIX*BAD*NEWS 0.0090 ( 0.48)
SIZE 0.0003 *** ( 4.36) 0.0003 *** ( 4.51) 0.0003 *** ( 4.46)
LEV 0.0001 *** ( 3.09) 0.0001 *** ( 2.98) 0.0001 *** ( 3.00)
BADPRE 0.0005 ( 1.24) 0.0005 ( 1.26) 0.0005 ( 1.33)
PRECAR -0.0179 *** (- 11.74) -0.0180 *** (- 11.78) -0.0180 *** (- 11.79)
BADPRE*PRECAR -0.0053 * (- 1.92) -0.0052 * (- 1.89) -0.0051 * (- 1.84)
Fixed Effects Year Year Year
Clustered SE Firm Firm Firm
N BW=0 229,671 229,671 229,671
N BW=1 44,987 44,987 44,987
% BAD BW=0 0.44 0.44 0.44
% BAD BW=1 0.46 0.46 0.46
R 2 0.029 0.029 0.029
F-Tests Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value
β6 + β7 = 0 -0.0059 0.6607 -0.0028 0.8388
Table 3: Asymmetric response to news in the wake of intra-industry bankruptcy 
Table 3 presents results from OLS estimation of the following model using firm-quarter earnings 
announcements over the period 1986-2007: 
 
 , 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,
6 , 7 , , ,
* *
* * * .
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t k i t i t
CAR BAD NEWS BAD NEWS BW BW BAD
BW NEWS BW BAD NEWS CONTROL
β β β β β β
β β β ε
= + + + + +
+ + + +∑
 
51 
 
Year fixed effects are based on calendar year of earnings announcement. CAR is firm i’s three-day cumulative 
abnormal return centered on its quarter t earnings announcement date. BAD is an indicator variable that =1 if 
NEWS < 0 and = 0 otherwise, where NEWS is firm i’s seasonally differenced quarterly earnings per share scaled 
by stock price two trading days prior to its quarter t earnings announcement. BW is an indicator variable that = 1 
if there was at least one intra-industry bankruptcy in the thirty calendar days immediately preceding firm i’s 
quarter t earnings announcement and = 0 otherwise. HVIX is an indicator variable that =1 if VIX is above the 
sample median value and = 0 otherwise, where VIX is the level of the VIX index two trading days prior to firm 
i’s quarter t earnings announcement. SIZE is the natural log of firm i’s quarter t market value of common equity. 
LEV is firm i’s total liabilities divided by book equity at the end of quarter t. BADPRE is an indicator variable 
that = 1 if PRECAR < 0 and = 0 otherwise, where PRECAR is firm i’s cumulative abnormal return beginning 
two trading days after its quarter t-1 earnings announcement and ending two trading days prior to its quarter t 
earnings announcement. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels, respectively. 
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Dependent Variable: CARi,t
(1) (2) (2)-(1)
DOBEA_CAR  Q1 DOBEA_CAR  Q4 Diff. in One-Tail
Parameter Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff. P-Value
Intercept 0.0060 *** ( 5.93) 0.0054 *** ( 5.34) -0.0006 ## 0.015
BAD -0.0175 *** (- 40.43) -0.0172 *** (- 40.18) 0.0002 ### 0.004
NEWS 0.1056 *** ( 9.03) 0.1096 *** ( 9.22) 0.0039 # 0.095
NEWS*BAD 0.0101 ( 0.67) 0.0107 ( 0.70) 0.0006 0.465
BW 0.0084 *** ( 6.81) -0.0017 (- 1.62) -0.0102 ### 0.000
BW*BAD -0.0027 (- 1.53) -0.0053 *** (- 3.05) -0.0026 0.123
BW*NEWS -0.0790 *** (- 2.57) -0.1493 *** (- 5.58) -0.0703 ## 0.033
BW*BAD*NEWS 0.0759 ** ( 2.04) 0.1729 *** ( 4.69) 0.0970 ## 0.029
CONTROLs included       Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Year Year
Clustered SE Firm Firm
N BW=0 229,671 229,671
N BW=1 11,247 11,246
% BAD BW=0 0.44 0.44
% BAD BW=1 0.51 0.43
R 2 0.031 0.030
F-Tests Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value
β6 + β7 = 0 -0.0031 0.8852 0.0236 0.3585
Table 4: Preemptive disclosure of good news 
Table 4 presents results from OLS estimation of the following model using firm-quarter earnings 
announcements over the period 1986-2007, for the upper and lower quartiles of BW=1 earnings announcements 
based on DOBEA_CAR: 
  , 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,
6 , 7 , , ,
* *
* * * .
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t k i t i t
CAR BAD NEWS BAD NEWS BW BW BAD
BW NEWS BW BAD NEWS CONTROL
β β β β β β
β β β ε
= + + + + +
+ + + +∑
 
DOBEA_CAR is firm i’s cumulative abnormal return between the three-day bankruptcy announcement window 
and the three-day quarter t earnings announcement window. Year fixed effects are based on earnings 
announcement dates. CAR is firm i’s three-day cumulative abnormal return centered on its quarter t earnings 
announcement date. BAD is an indicator variable that =1 if NEWS < 0 and = 0 otherwise, where NEWS is firm 
i’s seasonally differenced quarterly earnings per share scaled by stock price two trading days prior to quarter t 
earnings announcement. BW is an indicator variable that = 1 if there was at least one intra-industry bankruptcy 
in the thirty calendar days immediately preceding firm i’s quarter t earnings announcement and = 0 otherwise. 
CONTROLs are HVIX, HVIX*BAD, HVIX*NEWS, HVIX*BAD*NEWS, SIZE, LEV, BADPRE, PRECAR, and 
BADPRE*PRECAR. HVIX is an indicator variable that =1 if VIX is above the sample median value and = 0 
otherwise, where VIX is the level of the VIX index two trading days prior to firm i’s quarter t earnings 
announcement. SIZE is the natural log of firm i’s quarter t market value of common equity. LEV is firm i’s total 
liabilities divided by book equity at the end of quarter t. BADPRE is an indicator variable that = 1 if PRECAR < 
0 and = 0 otherwise, where PRECAR is firm i’s cumulative abnormal return beginning two trading days after its 
quarter t-1 earnings announcement and ending two trading days prior to quarter t earnings announcement. *, **, 
and *** (#, ##, ###) denote two-tailed (one-tailed) statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
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Dependent Variable: CARi,t
(1) (2) (2)-(1)
NBANK i,t  = 1 Diff. in One-Tail
Parameter Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff. P-Value
Intercept 0.0053 *** ( 5.35) 0.0059 *** ( 5.84) 0.0007 0.139
BAD -0.0176 *** (- 41.41) -0.0172 *** (- 40.09) 0.0003 ### 0.001
NEWS 0.1094 *** ( 9.45) 0.1097 *** ( 9.31) 0.0004 ## 0.029
NEWS*BAD 0.0039 ( 0.26) 0.0119 ( 0.78) 0.0080 0.584
BW 0.0010 ( 1.69) 0.0041 *** ( 2.87) 0.0031 ## 0.011
BW*BAD -0.0009 (- 1.04) -0.0046 ** (- 2.23) -0.0037 ## 0.034
BW*NEWS -0.0583 *** (- 2.96) -0.1635 *** (- 5.61) -0.1052 ### 0.001
BW*BAD*NEWS 0.0538 ** ( 2.12) 0.1665 *** ( 4.47) 0.1128 ## 0.011
CONTROLs included     Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Year Year
Clustered SE Firm Firm
N BW=0 229,671 229,671
N BW=1 36,754 8,233
% BAD BW=0 0.44 0.44
% BAD BW=1 0.46 0.48
R 2 0.030 0.030
F-Tests Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value
β6 + β7 = 0 -0.0046 0.7719 0.0030 0.8964
NBANK i,t  > 1
Table 5: Relative industry health 
Table 5 presents results from OLS estimation of the following model using firm-quarter earnings 
announcements over the period 1986-2007 for two separate partitions of BW=1 earnings announcements based 
on NBANK: 
  , 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,
6 , 7 , , ,
* *
* * * .
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β β β β β β
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= + + + + +
+ + + +∑
 
NBANK is the number of intra-industry bankruptcies in the thirty-day calendar window preceding the quarter t 
earnings announcement. Year fixed effects are based on calendar year of earnings announcement. CAR is firm 
i’s three-day cumulative abnormal return centered on its quarter t earnings announcement date. BAD is an 
indicator variable that =1 if NEWS < 0 and = 0 otherwise, where NEWS is firm i’s seasonally differenced 
quarterly earnings per share scaled by stock price two trading days prior to quarter t earnings announcement. 
BW is an indicator variable that = 1 if there was at least one intra-industry bankruptcy in the thirty calendar days 
immediately preceding firm i’s quarter t earnings announcement and = 0 otherwise. CONTROLs are HVIX, 
HVIX*BAD, HVIX*NEWS, HVIX*BAD*NEWS, SIZE, LEV, BADPRE, PRECAR, and BADPRE*PRECAR. 
HVIX is an indicator variable that =1 if VIX is above the sample median value and = 0 otherwise, where VIX is 
the level of the VIX index two trading days prior to firm i’s quarter t earnings announcement. SIZE is the 
natural log of firm i’s quarter t market value of common equity. LEV is firm i’s total liabilities divided by book 
equity at the end of quarter t. BADPRE is an indicator variable that = 1 if PRECAR < 0 and = 0 otherwise, 
where PRECAR is firm i’s cumulative abnormal return beginning two trading days after its quarter t-1 earnings 
announcement and ending two trading days prior to its quarter t earnings announcement. *, **, and *** (#, ##, 
###) denote two-tailed (one-tailed) statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Dependent Variable: CARi,t
(1) (2) (2)-(1)
Adj. R 2 < Median Adj. R 2 > Median Diff. in One-Tail
Parameter Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff. P-Value
Intercept 0.0068 *** ( 4.61) 0.0053 *** ( 3.90) -0.0014 0.204
BAD -0.0211 *** (- 33.73) -0.0141 *** (- 25.67) 0.0070 ### 0.001
NEWS 0.1266 *** ( 8.04) 0.0924 *** ( 5.44) -0.0342 # 0.061
NEWS*BAD -0.0155 (- 0.76) 0.0215 ( 1.00) 0.0370 # 0.081
BW 0.0000 ( 0.03) 0.0031 *** ( 4.06) 0.0031 ### 0.006
BW*BAD -0.0017 (- 1.33) -0.0018 (- 1.53) -0.0001 0.465
BW*NEWS -0.0627 *** (- 2.69) -0.1206 *** (- 4.56) -0.0578 ## 0.048
BW*BAD*NEWS 0.0571 * ( 1.84) 0.1279 *** ( 3.87) 0.0708 # 0.055
CONTROLs included Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Year Year
Clustered SE Firm Firm
N BW=0 111,511 110,535
N BW=1 21,111 22,088
% BAD BW=0 0.44 0.44
% BAD BW=1 0.46 0.46
R 2 0.037 0.022
F-Tests Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value
β6 + β7 = 0 -0.0057 0.781 0.0073 0.711
Table 6: Firm economic comparability with industry peers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 presents results from OLS estimation of the following model using firm-quarter earnings 
announcements over the period 1986-2007 for two partitions of BW=1 earnings announcements: 
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based on the adj-R2 from the following firm-specific regression using up to 36 monthly observations ending 
with the month of firms i’s quarter t end date: , 0 1 ,RET VWFFRETi m m i mα α ν= + + . RET is firm i’s raw return in 
month m. VWFFRET is the value-weighted return on firm i’s Fama-French 48 industry category in month m. 
CAR is firm i’s three-day cumulative abnormal return centered on its quarter t earnings announcement. BAD is 
an indicator variable =1 if NEWS < 0 and = 0 otherwise, where NEWS is firm i’s seasonally differenced 
quarterly earnings per share scaled by stock price two trading days prior to its quarter t earnings announcement. 
BW is an indicator variable = 1 if there was an intra-industry bankruptcy in the thirty calendar days immediately 
preceding firm i’s quarter t earnings announcement and = 0 otherwise. CONTROLs are HVIX, HVIX*BAD, 
HVIX*NEWS, HVIX*BAD*NEWS, SIZE, LEV, BADPRE, PRECAR, and BADPRE*PRECAR. HVIX is an 
indicator variable that =1 if VIX is above the sample median value and = 0 otherwise. VIX is the level of the 
VIX index two trading days prior to firm i’s quarter t earnings announcement. SIZE is the natural log of firm i’s 
quarter t market value of common equity. LEV is firm i’s total liabilities divided by book equity at the end of 
quarter t. BADPRE is an indicator variable that = 1 if PRECAR < 0 and = 0 otherwise. PRECAR is firm i’s 
cumulative abnormal return beginning two trading days after its quarter t-1 earnings announcement and ending 
two trading days prior to its quarter t earnings announcement. *, **, and *** (#, ##, ###) denote two-tailed (one-
tailed) statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
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Dependent Variable: CARi,t
(1) (2) (3)
HSCORE  = {0, 1} HSCORE  = {2} HSCORE  = {3}
Parameter Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat Coeff T-Stat
Intercept 0.0063 *** ( 3.09) 0.0045 ** ( 2.11) 0.0082 *** ( 2.94)
BAD -0.0212 *** (- 24.94) -0.0192 *** (- 22.41) -0.0213 *** (- 18.30)
NEWS 0.0695 *** ( 3.57) 0.1100 *** ( 5.25) 0.1973 *** ( 4.58)
NEWS*BAD 0.0155 ( 0.62) 0.0266 ( 0.95) -0.0778 (- 1.44)
BW 0.0010 ( 0.89) 0.0009 ( 0.75) 0.0025 * ( 1.65)
BW*BAD -0.0017 (- 1.01) -0.0018 (- 1.03) -0.0010 (- 0.43)
BW*NEWS -0.0720 ** (- 2.54) -0.1015 *** (- 3.21) -0.0792 (- 1.50)
BW*BAD*NEWS 0.0767 ** ( 2.12) 0.0937 ** ( 2.27) 0.0026 ( 0.04)
CONTROLs included    Yes    Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Year Year Year
Clustered SE Firm Firm Firm
N BW=0 62,508 58,060 33,640
N BW=1 13,316 12,500 6,993
% BAD BW=0 0.46 0.44 0.41
% BAD BW=1 0.48 0.46 0.44
R 2 0.030 0.029 0.033
F-Tests Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value
β6 + β7 = 0 0.0047 0.8355 -0.0078 0.774 -0.0767 0.101
Table 7: Earnings announcer financial health 
Table 7 presents results from OLS estimation of the following model using firm-quarter earnings 
announcements over the period 1987-2007: 
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where the sample is partitioned based on financial health (HSCORE). HSCORE = HCFO + HLIQUID + 
HLEVER, where HCFO is an indicator = 1 if cash flow from operations > 0 and = 0 otherwise, and HLIQUID 
(HLEVER) is an indicator = 1 if liquidity (leverage) is greater (less) than the industry-fiscal-quarter median. 
Year fixed effects are based on calendar year of earnings announcement. CAR is firm i’s three-day cumulative 
abnormal return centered on its quarter t earnings announcement date. BAD is an indicator variable that =1 if 
NEWS < 0 and = 0 otherwise, where NEWS is firm i’s seasonally differenced quarterly earnings per share scaled 
by stock price two trading days prior to its quarter t earnings announcement. BW is an indicator variable that = 1 
if there was at least one intra-industry bankruptcy in the thirty calendar days immediately preceding firm i’s 
quarter t earnings announcement and = 0 otherwise. CONTROLs are HVIX, HVIX*BAD, HVIX*NEWS, 
HVIX*BAD*NEWS, SIZE, LEV, BADPRE, PRECAR, and BADPRE*PRECAR. HVIX is an indicator variable 
that =1 if VIX is above the sample median value and = 0 otherwise, where VIX is the level of the VIX index two 
trading days prior to firm i’s quarter t earnings announcement. SIZE is the natural log of firm i’s quarter t 
market value of common equity. LEV is firm i’s total liabilities divided by book equity at the end of quarter t. 
BADPRE is an indicator variable that = 1 if PRECAR < 0 and = 0 otherwise, where PRECAR is firm i’s 
cumulative abnormal return beginning two trading days after its quarter t-1 earnings announcement and ending 
two trading days prior to its quarter t earnings announcement. *, **, and *** denote two-tailed statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Year # Bankruptcies Year # Bankruptcies Year # Bankruptcies
1985* 4 1993 43 2001 182
1986 73 1994 30 2002 148
1987 53 1995 41 2003 113
1988 63 1996 36 2004 59
1989 88 1997 43 2005 49
1990 89 1998 69 2006 35
1991 87 1999 93 2007** 15
1992 53 2000 119
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Figure 1: Distribution of bankruptcy filings by year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
   
 
*   Bankruptcy filing dates are truncated from below at December 6, 1985. 
  ** Bankruptcy filing dates are truncated from above at June 11, 2007. 
 
Figure 1 presents the calendar-year distribution of the 1,585 Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings underlying the final 
sample partition of earnings announcements that follow intra-industry bankruptcy. Bankruptcy filing dates 
range from December 6, 1985 through June 11, 2007. Therefore, data presented here for calendar years 1985 
and 2007 are not based on full calendar year periods. 
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Code Industry Name Code Industry Name Code Industry Name
1 Agriculture 19 Steel Works, Etc. 34 Personal Services
2 Food Products 20 Fabricated Products 35 Business Services
4 Alcoholic Beverages 21 Machinery 36 Computers
6 Recreational Products 22 Electrical Equipment 37 Electronic Equipment
7 Entertainment 23 Miscellaneous 38 Measuring and Control Equip
8 Printing and Publishing 24 Automobiles and Trucks 39 Business Supplies
9 Consumer Goods 25 Aircraft 40 Shipping Containers
10 Apparel 26 Shipbuilding, Railroad Eq 41 Transportation
11 Healthcare 27 Defense 42 Wholesale
12 Medical Equipment 28 Precious Metals 43 Retail
13 Pharmaceutical Products 29 Nonmetallic Mining 44 Restaurants, Hotel, Motel
14 Chemicals 30 Coal 45 Banking
15 Rubber and Plastic Products 31 Petroleum and Natural Gas 46 Insurance
16 Textiles 32 Utilities 47 Real Estate
17 Construction Materials 33 Telecommunications 48 Trading
18 Construction
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Bankruptcy by Fama-French 48 Classification
Figure 2: Distribution of bankruptcy filings by Fama-French 48 industry category 
  
 
Figure 2 presents the Fama-French 48 industry distribution of the 1,585 Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings 
underlying the final sample partition of earnings announcements that follow intra-industry bankruptcy. 
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Figure 3: Baseline asymmetry in the market response to earnings news over time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 plots the total coefficients on good (β2) and bad (β2+β3) news earnings from the following regression, 
estimated by calendar year of earnings announcement date, using the full sample of 274,658 quarterly earnings 
announcements: 
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CAR is firm i’s three-day cumulative abnormal return centered on its quarter t earnings announcement date. 
BAD is an indicator variable that = 1 if NEWS < 0 and = 0 otherwise, where NEWS is firm i’s seasonally 
differenced quarterly earnings per share scaled by stock price two trading days prior to its quarter t earnings 
announcement date. SIZE is the natural log of firm i’s market value of common equity at the end of quarter t. 
LEV is firm i’s total liabilities divided by book equity at the end of quarter t. BADPRE is an indicator variable 
that = 1 if PRECAR < 0 and = 0 otherwise, where PRECAR is the cumulative abnormal return from two trading 
days after earnings announcement for quarter t-1 through two trading days before earnings announcement for 
quarter t. 
 
